Abstract: Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of an equilibrium point (as well as for the existence of a dominating equilibrium point) in a two-person non-zerosum game of timing.
Introduction
Two toothpaste manufacturers are competing for a larger share of the dentifrice market. Each is in the process of developing a new and better toothpaste. The longer one company waits to introduce its new toothpaste, the better its chances are of successfully capturing a share of the market, if its product hits the stores first. (This is assuming that the toothpaste is being technologically improved as time goes on.) Alternatively, if a company waits too long to introduce its product, then it might be too late to successfully capture any of the market. (Everyone might already be quite happy brushing with the other company's toothpaste introduced just last week!) Essentially, the problem for each company is one of choosing a time at which to introduce their particular brand of toothpaste to the public.
Two researchers are working independently on a particular problem. When to publish one's results is a big question. By publishing one's results first, one has some advantage over the other. Alternatively, by waiting until later, one can capitalize on weaknesses in the other's results.
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The above examples illustrate some characteristics of a 2-person noisy game of timing which may or may not be zerosum. Mathematically, a 2-person noisy game of timing has the following structure. The player set is {P1, P2 ). The pure strategy set for Pi consists of all choices of times of action in [0, 1 ], the closed unit interval. The strategy set for Pi then consists of all cumulative distribution functions on the closed unit interval. Let the strategy set for Pi be denoted by F. Thus F ~ F if F is a right-continuous, non-negative, non-decreasing real-valued function defined on the real line R such that F (t) = 0 for t < 0 and F (t) = 1 for t ~> 1. Let the degenerate distribution with a jump of 1 at a point T E [0, 1 ] be denoted by ~ T" Thus ~T(t)={i fort~>Tf~ or, alternatively, we may write 8 T (T) --8 T (T--) = 1.
The payoff to Pi, if each Pk acts according to a pure strategy 8 tk, tg E [0, 1 ] for k = 1,2, is denoted by K i (~ti, ~t/) and is equal to If P1 and P2 choose mixed strategies F1 and F2 in F, then the payoff to Pi' denoted by K i (F i, F] ), is equal to the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral of the kernel K i (~ti , ~t] ) with respect to the measures F~ and F2, i.e. [0, 1] [0,11 [0,t] where a
Ki(Fi, F] ) = f Ki(St, F])dFi(t)

= f ( f Mi(s)dF/(s)+i~i(t)%(t)+Li(t)(1--F/(t)))dFi(t)
] (t) = F] (t) --F] (t --) is the size of the ]ump at t ofF].
The above 2-person game of timing will be denoted by ( F, K1, K~). The early literature concentrates on EP's of 2-person zerosum games of timing with various restrictions on the kernels of each player. See BlackweIl [ 1948] , Blackwell
